What has been has been; what is is ; what w i l l be w i l l be. Where in th is s o lid it y is there room fo r the a lte rn a tiv e paths seemingly demanded by "can"s and "could"s? What is the r e la tio n o f th a t which can be, could be, or could have been to th a t which is , was or w i l l be? The suggestions th a t "can" is ambiguous and th a t i t is im p lic it ly c o n d itio n a l are re je c te d . I t is argued instead th a t " c a n 't" is the a ffirm a tiv e , a s s e rtin g the existence o f one or more "p re ve n te rs" o f the event in que stio n . "Can," i t s c o n tra d ic to ry , is then a c tu a lly the n e g ative , denying the existence o f a lim ite d set o f preventers g e n e ra lly s p e c ifie d more or less c le a r ly and d e lim ite d more or less sharply by the context in ques tio n . This e lim in a te s one, ille g it im a t e , class o f d e te r m in is tic w o rrie s over r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra ise and blame, but merely in te n s ifie s those o f another, genuine, k in d .
Cans and Can'ts
Cans and coulds seem to be a m etaphysical w art on the smooth face o f being i t s e l f .
I t is not ju s t a m atter o f t h e ir apparent in con sisten cy w ith determinism as a w e lldefined d o c trin e or set o f d o ctrin e s about the comprehen siveness o f s p e c ific forms o f s c ie n t if ic laws and explana tio n s . I t is not even ju s t a m atter o f th e ir apparent in consistency w ith something a t once broader and more basic lik e a p r in c ip le o f s u f f ic ie n t reason. The seeming con f l i c t begins a t a s t i l l deeper and more p rim itiv e le v e l. The w orld is e ve ryth in g th a t ^s the case. What has been has been, what is is , what w i l l be w i l l be. Where then in the s o lid it y o f th is adamantine r e a lit y is there room, is there space, fo r the a lte rn a tiv e paths seemingly demand ed by cans and coulds? What is the r e la tio n o f th a t which can be, could be or could have been to th a t which is , was or w i l l be?
The problem atic nature o f r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra is e and blame has then seemed but a c o ro lla r y o f th a t o f cans and coulds. R e s p o n s ib ility and p ra ise or blame presumably adhere or adhere ju s t ly only to agents who can do or could have done otherw ise. Questionable sta tu s fo r the former t r i o thus appears no more than a lo g ic a l consequence o f th a t o f the la t t e r p a ir .
Small wonder, then, th a t, as J . L. A u s tin in im ita b ly phrased i t , " I n philosophy i t is can in p a r tic u la r th a t we seem so o fte n to uncover, ju s t when we had thought some problem s e ttle d , g rin n in g r e s id u a lly up a t us lik e the fro g a t the bottom o f the beer mug."-*-I s h a ll attem pt to show th a t, w h ile previous attem pts to solve the general problem o f "can"s and "co u ld "s are less than com pletely s a tis fa c to ry , a ra th e r more prom ising a l te rn a tiv e is a v a ila b le . In s e c tio n I I I I s h a ll then b r i e f ly in d ic a te how th is a n a lysis does indeed help to reso lve one s o rt o f d e te rm in is tic w orry, but leaves others even more worrisome than b e fo re .
I I
One popular approach to "canMs and "co uld"s has been to regard the terms as r a d ic a lly ambiguous. Thus "A can X" might mean "A has the a b i l i t y (whatever th a t is ) to X ," or "A has the o p p o rtu n ity (whatever th a t is ) to X ," or "A 's Xing is lo g ic a lly c o n s is te n t," or "A 's Xing would v io la te no law o f n a tu re ," or "A 's Xing would not be im m oral," and so on. But here "and so on" does not mean " i n the same w ay," fo r there is not supposed here to be any such way, p a tte rn or principle.N ow there is c le a r ly something c o rre c t in th is approach. These d iffe re n c e s do o b ta in . I f anyone wants to use the term "ambiguous" to s ig n a liz e them, I do not see any over whelming o b je c tio n . But a t the same time we must recognize th a t the mere fa c t th a t there are v a ria b le s c e r ta in ly does not exclude the p o s s ib ilit y o f a general p r in c ip le u n itin g them.
One could on the same ground c a ll " I " ambiguous since i t re fe rs sometimes to one person and sometimes to another, or "now" ambiguous because i t re fe rs to a d i f f e r ent time whenever used, o r, to take a case where the claim has a c tu a lly been made, th a t "good" is ambiguous because a good straw berry is la rg e , red , sweet and ju ic y w h ile a good person is w ise, temperate, courageous and ju s t .
2 See, fo r examples, A u s tin , o£. c i t . 178 and F. V.
Raab, "Free W ill and the Am biguity o f C ould," The P h ilo sophical Review, 64 (1955)» 60-77. In each o f these cases the d iffe re n c e s are th e re , but so too is a common p r in c ip le which explains them. " I " re fe rs on some occasions to Smith and on others to Jones because i t re fe rs always to the speaker or w r it e r , and th is is on some occasions Smith and on others Jones. "Now" re fe rs to the time o f u tte ra n c e , and th is w a its fo r no one. "Good" is a grading la b e l, an a d je c tiv e o f commendation, and d iffe r e n t th in g s w i l l in e v ita b ly be graded fo r d i f f e r ent purposes, commended on d iffe r e n t grounds. Surely i t is not unreasonable to suppose th a t there may be some such common p r in c ip le lu rk in g in the background also in the case o f our also a d m itte d ly d iffe r e n t uses o f "can" and "c o u ld ." I s h a ll th e re fo re take the "a s ib ig u ity d o c trin e " as the stro n g e r th e s is th a t no such u n ify in g p r in c ip le e x is ts .
V ir t u a lly the sole form taken by attem pts to enunciate such a p r in c ip le , to solve to g e th e r the tw in problems o f re c o n c ilin g "can" w ith " i s " w h ile a t the same time d is cerning id e n tity in d iffe re n c e , has been to tr e a t "can"s and "co u ld "s as im p lic it c o n d itio n a ls . This is the view o f cans as, in A u s tin 's phrase, " c o n s titu tio n a lly i f f y . "
Two fa m ilia r examples o f such analyses are the con stitu a is o f "He can do X" as He w i l l do X i f he wants t o , " on the one hand, and "He w i l l do X i f he t r i e s , " on the o th e rs .
I t is tru e th a t even i f one o r the o th e r o f these p a r tic u la r analyses were otherwise s u ita b le as a re s o lu tio n o f the te nsion w ith being, n e ith e r, c le a r ly , would reso lve the problem o f general p r in c ip le . N e ith e r seems h ig h ly s u ita b le f o r , fo r example, "Summer n ig h ts can be c h i l l y in the Sonoran d e s e rt," or "The g re at w hite shark can grow to a le ng th o f 30 f e e t . " Surely we are not saying e ith e r o f the n ig h ts or o f the sharks e ith e r th a t they w i l l i f they want to or th a t they w i l l i f they t r y . But th is problem in tu rn m ight be resolved by regarding the two analyses as instances o f a general c o n d itio n a l form. "A can do X" would then be analyzed as "A w i l l do For examples, G. E. Moore, E th ics and P. H. NowellSmith, E th ic s . X i f Y" w ith "Y" as w e ll as "A" and "X" a w a itin g s p e c ific a tio n in o r by the p a r tic u la r c o n te x t.Â gainst th is s o rt o f a n a lysis a number o f o b je c tio n s o f g re a te r o r le s s e r s u b tle ty m ight be ra is e d . Some o f these, e s p e c ia lly in the area o f inadequacy o f p o s itiv e support fo r the p o s itio n , have already been considered in the lit e r a t u r e by A u s tin and o th e rs . Over most o f these ob je c tio n s , however, I s h a ll not t a r r y , since they pale to in s ig n ific a n c e before the com pletely u n su b tle , but a t the same time com pletely f a t a l fa c t th a t th is s o rt o f a n a lysis sim ply does n o t, and cannot, c o rr e c tly c h a ra cte rize our a c tu a l uses o f "canMs and nc o u ld "s .
Let us co nsid e r, w ith some care fo r a change, one example o f such a use. Suppose I c a ll a random tr a v e l agent on the telephone. "Can I f l y to Winnipeg on Saturday next?" I ask. She checks the a ir lin e schedules and the computer fo r re s e rv a tio n s . "Y es," she then r e p lie s , "you ca n." What has happened?
Is there in th is s itu a tio n any Y whatsoever such th a t th is tr a v e l agent is in a p o s itio n to say th a t i f Y, I w i l l f l y to Winnipeg on Saturday? Is she saying th a t I w i l l i f I want to? For a l l she knows I may have no money. Is she saying I w i l l i f I try ? For a l l she knows I may be irre m e d ia b ly confined to the s ta te h o s p ita l fo r the c r im in a lly insane. I f such backgrounds are supposedly somehow assumed out o f e xiste n ce , how is she to know th a t I w o n 't sim ply oversleep on the p ro je c te d day o f depar ture? C le a rly none o f th is w i l l do. The employer o f "can" sim ply does not have the in fo rm a tio n which would be re q u ire d fo r even the most casual and everyday " w i l l i f . . . " I f he d id have such in fo rm a tio n on the other hand, th a t, ra th e r than "can" is p re c is e ly what he would say.
I t is a lso w orthy o f note in passing th a t the am biguity For example, M. W hite, "On What Could Have Happened," The P h ilo s o p h ic a l Review, 77 (1968) , 73-89.
F-3
d o c trin e is not merely to be fa u lte d as premature d e fe a t ism, but is by examples o f th is kin d also p o s itiv e ly c o u n te rin d ic a te d . On f i r s t o b ta in in g her p o s itio n our tr a v e l agent had to le a rn to read the schedules and to communicate w ith the re se rva tio n s computer. But she d id not have to le a rn a s p e c ia l tr a v e l age nt's sense o f "ca n ". Nor is th is because she is a u to m a tic a lly employing some one o f various generic senses. Her ignorance o f my s itu a tio n also ru le s out her a s s e rtin g my a b i l i t y or oppor tu n ity or the le g a lit y or m o ra lity o f my t r i p . Checking the re s e rv a tio n s is h a rd ly e ith e r necessary o r s u f f ic ie n t to assure her o f i t s c o m p a tib ility w ith the laws o f nature or o f lo g ic . What then _is going on in these uses o f "can"s and "could"s?
A u s tin has c a lle d to our a tte n tio n the fa c t th a t p a irs o f terms such th a t one is in surface grammar a p o s itiv e or a ffir m a tiv e and the o th e r i t s negative may in t h e ir a c tu a l usage fu n c tio n in p re c is e ly the opposite way, and th a t our d i f f i c u l t i e s in a n a lysis o f such terms may r e s u lt from m ista kin g th is surface fo r th a t depth. His c h ie f example was " r e a l" . In saying th a t something is not re a l we are a s s e rtin g th a t there is some s p e c ia l basis fo r challenge. Thus the g o ld fin c h might be s tu ffe d , but there is no suggestion th a t i t is a m irage; the oasis might be a m irage, but there is no suggestion th a t i t is s tu ffe d . When we say, then, th a t something i£ r e a l, we are denying the existence o f ju s t such a s p e c ia l b a s is , ra th e r than a s s e rtin g , as philosophers have so o fte n supposed, the occurrence o f some arcane p ro p e rty possessed in common by r e a l watches and r e a l cream, but u n fo rtu n a te ly lacked by toy watches and n on -d a iry w hiten e rs.5 Whether or not th is is a s a tis fa c to ry a n a lysis o f " r e a l" , i t does seem q u ite a c c u ra te ly to ch a ra c te riz e "can"s and " c a n 't" s . W ith respect to v i r t u a l l y any event the occurrence or non-occurrence o f which may concern us there w i l l be a 5 P h ilo s o p h ic a l Papers, 5^"57. See also Sense and Sensib i l i a (London: Oxford U n iv e rs ity Press, 1962), 68-77. large, often indefinitely large, class of what I shall call "preventers". Those are factors such that there is, we believe, a rule or lawlike condition to the effect that if one obtains, the event in question will not occur. "Can't," while looking negative, actually affirms the existence of one or more of these preventers. It of course implies "will not," but does so by asserting its ground, and thus assurance. This is the difference between "cannot" and merely "will not". "Can", while looking affirmative, is still indubitably the contradictory of "can't". Thus since the latter affirms, the former denies. It denies, moreover, precisely what the other affirms: not the existence of the entire class of preven ters, but of a limited subclass. "Can"s and "could"s, then, serve to deny the existence of a limited class of preventers generally specified more or less clearly and delimited more or less sharply by the context in question. They do this either by denying that the preventer in ques tion actually obtains, or by denying that it is a preven ter-"can anyway". Note how precisely this describes, and how completely it demystifies, the transaction between the travel agent and myself. What was there at issue was not the discovery of the presence of factors such that if they were to obtain I would fly to Winnipeg either absolutely or on any speci fiable further condition. It was rather the discovery of the absence of factors such that if they were to obtain, I would not fly to Winnipeg. Nor was it even a question of some kind of complete survey of these.
With respect to my flying to Winnipeg the class of preventers is very large. It includes lack of motivation, lack of money, lack of time, fear of flying, absence of scheduled flights, lack of space on these flights, and many many others. In asking the travel agent "Can I fly to Winnipeg on Saturday?" I was asking her only whether a limited subset of these conditions, more or less clearly specified by the context, did in fact obtain. Her reply "You can" informed me, but informed me only, that these particular preventers did not.
F-5
This, then, is the way the game is actually played, the way the words are used. This is the meaning of "can" and "could". Once this is seen, once we stop trying to look at the matter backwards, the other factors fall effort lessly into place.
Notice first that the data which prompted the ambiguity doctrine are on the present thesis accommodated nicely without the further presumption of any ambiguity at all.
We do not need to assume d iffe r e n t meanings o f "ca n ". We are using i t the same way in every case. What is always a t issue is th a t c e rta in preventers do not o b ta in . But there are d iffe re n c e s s t i l l .
In d iffe r e n t cases d iffe r e n t preventers w i l l be a t issue. Thus the preventers may be lo g ic a l as in "We can v a lid ly in fe r th is from t h a t . " They may be p h y s ic a l as in "The sump can be drained by removing the p lu g ." They may be p sych o lo g ica l as in " I could have jumped fo r jo y . " They may be le g a l as in " A ll c itiz e n s over 18 can v o te ." They may be moral as in "We can c e r t a in ly break a t r i v i a l promise where keeping i t would endanger human l i f e . " They may be mere m atters o f s o c ia l procedure as in "An appointment was cancelled so I can see you th is a fte rn o o n ." And so on and on. Of p re ve n te rs, and even o f v a ry in g c la s s ific a tio n s o f p re ven te rs, there is no end.
There is, as a matter of fact, a class of cases handled easily by the present thesis which seems flatly inconsis tent with the ambiguity doctrine. These are the cases in which we use a single "can" or "could", but do so with very different sorts of preventer in view. Take "Let's go inside where we can talk," for example. Here the factors preventing conversation outdoors but presumed to be absent indoors might be intense traffic noise, a phy sical preventer, and the necessity of standing, a psycho logical one. If the ambiguity doctrine were correct, we might expect to have to use two cans in such a case: "...where we can talk and can talk," while actually a single one does it nicely. Nor could one argue that all such cases are to be handled as falling under the same generic type, the "can of opportunity" for example, with out revealing the arbitrariness of such classifications, 904 
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and t h e ir consequent u n s u it a b ilit y fo r d is tin g u is h in g o r id e n tify in g meanings. Thus why should we not say o f one or the o the r or both o f these preventers th a t what is involved is not a "can o f o p p o rtu n ity " but a "can o f a b ilit y " ? Had we stro n g e r voices the t r a f f i c noise would pose no problem. Had we a p e r ip a te tic p ro p e n s ity , or even a s to ic in d iffe re n c e , to standing, n e ith e r would the absence o f se ating m atter in the le a s t.
At the same time the w id e ly va ry in g kinds o f preventers a v a ila b le makes i t c le a r how we must construe our dictum about preventers being fa c to rs such th a t should they o b ta in the event in question w i l l not occur. This should have been c le a r even from our i n i t i a l example. Some people c h a rte r or even purchase a irp la n e s to take them where and when r e g u la r ly scheduled a ir lin e s w i l l n o t, or b rib e o f f i c ia ls or stow away. The tr a v e l agent knows th is . So the " w i l l n o t" which would be grounded by absence o f f lig h t s or space on them is a w i l l not w ith in the normal proce dures. So to o , on a s p e c ific occasion is the " w i l l n o t" o f " c a n 't in fe r th is from th a t " , a " w i l l not lo g ic a lly " , the " w i l l n o t" , o f " c a n 't v o te ", a " w i l l not le g a lly " , the " w i l l n o t" o f " c a n 't break a prom ise", a " w i l l not m o ra lly ", and so on.
This leads in tu rn to the m a tte r o f the s p e c ific a tio n o f such v a ry in g preventers by c o n te x t. I t is undeniable th a t some "can"s are p e r fe c tly c o n s is te n t w ith some " c a n 't" s . This is another o f the p ro p e rtie s o f the am b ig u it y d o c trin e handled even more g ra c e fu lly on the present th e s is w ith o u t the assumption o f am biguity. Consider the o ld joke in which the character smoking d ir e c t ly beneath a "No Smoking" sign is to ld , "You c a n 't smoke h e re ," and r e t o r t s , " I not merely can, I am." This is a jo k e , o r an attem pt a t a jo k e , p re c is e ly because what is in surface grammar a c o n tra d ic tio n is in depth grammar even worse than a complete irre le v a n c e . The preventers involved in the i n i t i a l statement were le g a l and moral as was made e n tir e ly c le a r by i t s being the very act o f smoking which provoked the statem ent. The use o f th a t same a ct to ground the d e n ia l o f e n tir e ly ir re le v a n t F-7 physical preventers is thus doubly flagrant. Nor would the coach who proudly averred "Smith can clean and jerk 300 pounds now," be refuted by someone's pointing out that since Smith is asleep he can't lift anything at all. Nor would the allergist who informed his patient, "You can eat anything made of chocolate so long as it doesn't have nuts in it," be dismayed or inclined to retract by the information that the patient's poverty and the high cost of chocolate meant that she could not eat anything made of chocolate. The preventer in the former context was lack of neuro-muscular development, in the latter allergic reaction. Sleep and personal economics are as irrelevant here as we observed them to be in our travel agent example.
Yet the matter is not quite so simple. It is true that the travel agent did not have to inquire into the state of my health. But this is not because her "You can" just meant flights and scheduled space available. If she had known, for example, of a tornado's having completely blown away the Winnipeg airport, it would have been incumbent on her to say "You can't". For this sort of preventer, unlike my institutional commitment, is within her sphere. So too would our allergist be undeterred by the knowledge that the patient's children inevitably ate up all the chocolate in the house before she ever had a chance at it, but not simply because this is not an affair of aller gies. If he knew that her peculiar physiology with choco late would produce a strong toxin he would surely have then to say, "You can't" even though this reaction could not in any sense be classified as allergic. This is because the latter, but not the former, is within the scope of the physician's responsibility. Suppose I say, "When we get these two screws out we can lift off the cover plate." We get the screws out but are called away before we have a chance to remove the plate. I was not proved wrong. If, on the other hand, on getting the two screws out we find the plate still held by a third which was previously hidden, then I was wrong, The call was as effective a preventer as the hidden screw, but was not, as the latter was, the sort of 906 
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preventer here a t issue. Thus preventers are s p e c ifie d by c o n te x t, but in s u b tle , complex and various ways o fte n incomplete enough so th a t we should h a rd ly expect always to know p re c is e ly which preventers are or are not a t issue in every case.
In a d d itio n to these c e n tra l fa c to rs the present th e s is e x p la in s , as one would hope i t would, more p e rip h e ra l aspects o f our use o f "can"s and "c o u ld "s . I t e x p la in s, fo r example, why doing sometimes grounds "can" and some times does n o t.
The preventers in volved must, to begin w ith , be the re le v a n t ones. Thus the mere fa c t th a t our smoker is smoking does by no means e s ta b lis h th a t he is not thereby v io la tin g the c it y ordinance, the p reventer in volved in h is c r i t i c ' s " c a n 't " . Nor would the a c tu a l consumption o f however g re at q u a n titie s o f nuts by our a lle r g is t 's p a tie n t vo id h is " c a n 't " , provided the p re d ic te d a lle r g ic re a c tio n occured.
Granted the relevance o f the preventers there is also the q ue stio n o f t h e ir s t a b i l i t y . Yes, you d id stand on your head once, but perhaps i t was an a ccid e n t. Perhaps the preventers were but in a momentary s ta te o f re la x a tio n and are now retu rne d to th e ir accustomed v ig ila n c e . Do i t again. Do i t two or three tim es. Then we w i l l be in a b e tte r p o s itio n to say "You can." Yes, you could stand on your head twenty years ago, as shown by the fa c t th a t you d id repeatedly do i t twenty years ago. But you are now twenty years o ld e r and s t i f f e r, so we cannot, w ith o u t more c u rre n t data, say "You can".
Granted the relevance and s t a b i l i t y o f the p re ve n te rs, however, there w i l l be no b e tte r ground p o ssib le fo r "A can X" than A 's Xing. The basis o f " c a n 't" on the present th e s is is the c o n ju n ctio n o f the ru le ( i f p then not q) and p. That q is tru e thus im plies th a t e ith e r the ru le or the antecedent o r both f a i l , th a t " c a n 't" is th e re fo re not a p p lic a b le , and th a t i t s d e n ia l, "ca n", thus is a p p li cable. So we say th a t desert n ig h ts can be cool in F-9 summer because they have been. This shows th a t the gen e ra l fa c to rs such as m oisture and s o il com position and ground cover which in the F i j i Is la n d s , say, prevent such temperature flu c tu a tio n s do not here o b ta in . We say th a t the g re at w hite shark can grow to t h i r t y fe e t because specimens o f th a t species have. This shows th a t the gene t i c , n u t r it io n a l, p re d a to r-p a ra s ite fa c to rs which prevent such growth in the g o ld fis h are not u n iv e rs a lly present w ith the shark.
Even w ider ranging data than these are by the present th e s is n ic e ly accounted f o r . We see, fo r example, why c h ild re n have to be corrected over perm issions. "Can I go out and p la y s tic k b a ll? " they ask.
"You mean, 'May I ' , " th e ir mentors re p ly , " I t ' s c le a r th a t you can. " But fo r the c h ild the la c k o f perm ission is as good a p reventer as a broken le g , perhaps b e tte r . This is not to say th a t the lin g u is t ic community is some how wrong in tr e a tin g a s p e c ia l class o f preventers s p e c ia lly . But i t does e x p la in why the c h ild , accepting the sim plest ru le here, ju s t as he does in saying, "d rin k e d " ra th e r than "d ra n k ", w i l l need s p e c ia l t u it i o n in regard to th is c o m p lica tio n .
The sole rem aining p o te n tia l source o f re sista n ce to the th e s is I am advancing would seem to be the fe e lin g some might have th a t in h o ld in g th a t "cans" deny a lim ite d class o f preventers I am not doing ju s tic e to th a t " a l l out sense" o f "can" the existence o f which has been cla im ed by A u s tin and o th e rs . I have thus tr ie d very hard to fin d examples in which such an " a l l outness" m ight p la u s ib ly be claim ed. I have found none. The nearest I can come to anything which even looks as though i t m ight do is the ra th e r e s o te ric example o f quantum mechanics w ith i t s "no hidden param eters" dictum .
Before co nsid e ring the relevance o f th is example to the lim ite d class aspect o f my th e s is , however, note th a t the case is not merely c o n s is te n t w ith the d e n ia l aspect o f th a t th e s is , but v i r t u a l l y re q u ire s i t .
Thus suppose we have a p a r tic le e m itte r and a d e te c tio n screen. An em itted p a r tic le s trik e s the screen. " I t could have gone here ra th e r than th e re ," the quantum mechanician t e l l s us. The am biguity d o c trin e is , o f course, here ru le d out on much the same grounds th a t d is q u a lifie d i t in the tr a v e l agent case. I t is thus o f g re at s ig n ific a n c e to re a liz e th a t th is s o rt o f example sim ply cannot be handled a t a l l , even im p la u s ib ly , by the c o n d itio n a l view, o r, more g e n e ra lly , on any view o f "can" as a ffir m a tiv e . The quantum mechanician not merely does not w ish to a s s e rt, but e x p li c it l y denies th a t there is any Y such th a t i f Y had obtained the p a r tic le would have s tru c k the second p o in t. There are no hidden param eters. There is then sim ply nothing l e f t fo r him to mean save what my th e s is would have him mean: preventers do n o t, or d id n o t, o b ta in .
Nor is th is case a c tu a lly in c o n s is te n t even w ith the second fa c e t o f my th e s is , th a t the preventers a t issue in a given use form a lim ite d subclass o f a l l p re ven te rs. I t is tru e th a t the quantum mechanician is in a most un u s u a l, not to say unique, s itu a tio n . Which o f the re s t o f us, in which fie ld s o f our endeavor, is ever in a p o s itio n to say, "There are no hidden param eters," and only th us, on the u n lim ite d class view , to say "can" or "could"? I t is ju s t fo r th is reason th a t so e s o te ric an example as quantum mechanics is necessary. Some p h y s i c is t s , indeed, lik e E in s te in , would deny th a t even o f quantum mechanical phenomena is th is tru e . I t is thus a l l the more s ig n ific a n t to see th a t even in th is extreme case i t is s t i l l a lim ite d class o f p re venters th a t is a t issue. The only preventers here in volved are p h y s ic a l, d e te r m in is tic a lly , not p r o b a b ilis t i c a lly , causal ones. Even the quantum mechanician would n o t, fo r example, wish to hold th a t the laws o f h is do main are a p r i o r i . He would thus have to admit th a t i t could be otherw ise.
Or suppose our quantum mechanician is also a compul sive gambler. He has staked h is l i f e ' s savings, such as they are, th a t the next p a r tic le w i l l s tr ik e the bottom ra th e r than the top h a lf o f the d e te c tio n screen. He knows, as quantum mechanician, th a t i t can s tr ik e the top h a lf , and in fa c t th a t the p r o b a b ilitie s are equal. But now, w h ile a nxio u sly a w a iting the fa t e f u l event, the f u l l im p lic a tio n s o f h is fin a n c ia l r u in begin to s tr ik e home to him and he murmurs, " I t sim ply c a n 't h i t the to p ." I l l W ith "can"s and "ca n , t" s in general moderately w e ll under c o n tro l le t us tu rn a t le a s t b r ie f l y to the im p lic a tio n s o f th is understanding fo r r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra is e and blame, fre e w i l l and determ inism . For the c o rre c t a s c rip tio n o f r e s p o n s ib ility and d is tr ib u tio n o f p ra ise or blame to a su b je ct "He could have done o therw ise" must be tru e o f him. I s h a ll c a ll general w orries about the tr u t h o f th is expression, " d e te rm in is tic w o rrie s ."
One sub-class o f d e te rm in is tic w o rrie s I s h a ll c a ll the "m e ta p h ysica l". This is sim ply the a p p lic a tio n to human a f f a ir s o f the general concern w ith which we began, the concern th a t "can"s and "co u ld "s are somehow in c o n s is te n t w ith the s o lid it y o f r e a lit y whether th is is re p re sented by the foreknowledge o f God, the u n iv e r s a lity o f s c ie n t if ic law, or o therw ise. Since the hardness in volved in our time u s u a lly takes the form o f ca u s a l/in d e te rm ini s t i c mechanism, I s h a ll fo r s p e c if ic it y deal w ith i t here in these terms.
Let us then suppose fo r purposes o f argument th a t the human being is a complex biochem ical machine, a "meat machine" in K urt Vonnegut's n ice phrase. Each o f i t s events is the product o f p r io r causes, o r, perhaps to some e xten t a t le a s t, indeterm inate in the quantum mechanical sense. The la t t e r , o f course, is in d iffe r e n t to the present issu e. C areful th in k e rs since P la to have re a liz e d th a t e q u a lly w ith n ece ssity does chance seem the enemy o f freedom. How then can we apply to human a c tio n the "co uld have done otherw ise" necessary fo r responsi b i l i t y and ju s t i f i e d p ra is e or blame, reward or 910 F-12 punishment?
The answer to th is question provided by the th e s is I have been proposing is c le a r. "Can" denies a lim ite d class o f p re ve n te rs. Some uses o f "c o u ld " are thus en t i r e l y compatible w ith some uses o f "co uld n o t" even when the very same event remains under d iscu ssio n . The "co u ld have done othe rw ise" which grounds r e s p o n s ib ility denies, not a l l p re ve n te rs, but o nly the s e le c t class o f those th a t d im in ish or destroy r e s p o n s ib ility . Thus th a t you could not have done otherw ise since your elbow was jo g g le d lim it s your r e s p o n s ib ility , and excuses; th a t you could not have done otherw ise since you have a v ic io u s charac te r does not so l i m i t , and does not so excuse.
The answer to th is q u e stio n , however, leads n a tu r a lly to a second. Why do some preventers thus l i m it re sp o n si b i l i t y w h ile others do not?
One kin d o f answer to th is question very popular since W ittg e n s te in has been th a t these d is tin c tio n s sim ply de fin e the in s t it u t i o n o f m o ra lity , r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra ise and blame. This is the way the game is played. M oral i t y is not a device we have constructed to a tta in some fu rth e r end. I t is i t s e l f a source, a p re s u p p o s itio n a l m a trix , o f e v a lu a tio n s . Thus to expect ju s t if ic a t io n o f i t s fundamental d is tin c tio n s is somewhat comparable to expecting a snake to swallow i t s e l f . A l l th is is tru e and im p o rta n t, b u t more can be sa id . This game has not merely ru le s but also a p o in t.
Some machines, sometimes, do th in g s others d o n 't. A number o f us have found the example o f the chess p la y in g computer suggestive here.6 Such a machine is fa r more simple minded than a human being. Nor is a l l o f l i f e £°F or examples o f a somewhat more extended treatm ent o f th is analogy see my "D e lib e ra tio n and Determ inism ," Ameri can P h ilo s o p h ic a l Q u a rte rly , 6 (1969), 53-61 and D. C. Dennett, " In te n tio n a l Systems," The Journal o f P h ilo sophy, 68 (1971), 87-106.
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q u ite lik e chess. But we do fin d , even w ith such a machine, th a t, w h ile i t is in d u b ita b ly a m echanical/elect r i c a l contrivance fir m ly wedged w ith in the c a u s a l/in d ete r m in is tic netw ork, th is is not the whole s to ry . Some o f i t s m e c h a n ic a l/e le c tric a l events or sta te s in t h e ir contexts are describable as the e n te rta in in g o f ends, others as b e lie fs about the w o rld , s t i l l others as a ctio n s to r e a liz e those ends in the context o f those b e lie fs .
The f a ilu r e to see the complete consistency o f th is r a tio n a l agency le v e l o f discourse w ith the causal/mechanic a l re q u ire s an out and out category m istake. I t r e q u ire s an assumption much lik e , to continue w ith a chess analogy, th a t basing Bruce Hayden's claim to have a chess s ty le showing "marked s im ila r it y to th a t o f Morphy--Bishops moving along diagonals, Rooks along f i l e s , K n ig h t's one hop, and so o n ."7 of course one has to have a causa1/mechanical basis fo r r a tio n a l agency, ju s t as one has to have bishops moving along the diagonals to have a chess s ty le a t a l l . The la t t e r in both cases is even, i f you w i l l , "o n ly " the form er. But i f i t is only the form er, i t is a t the same tim e, and w ith equal ind u b it a b ilit y in both cases, a ve ry s p e c ia l form o f the form er o n ly .
Should we then say th a t the computer is not " r e a lly " tr y in g to dislodge my k n ig h t, but sim ply c lic k in g tr a n s is to rs? But what is "n o t r e a lly tr y in g to dislodge my k n ig h t" supposed to mean here i f not something lik e "en gaged in a f e in t to d isgu ise some deep combination"? And could we not say a t le a s t e q u a lly w e ll th a t i t is r e a lly the attem pt to dislodge my k n ig h t th a t is basic? I do not know or care about i t s mechanical b a s is . That could be q u ite in d if f e r e n t ly any number o f th in g s . That would be very d iffe r e n t w ith a human opponent. The th re a t As quoted in I . Cherner, The 1000 Best Short Games o f Chess (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955)» 121.
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would remain the same.
Such a chess p la y in g machine, then, has a lre a d y , and w ith o u t the s lig h te s t c o n f lic t w ith i t s causal/m echanical machinehood, to some degree the ch aracter o f r a tio n a l agent. So too may we. And th is fa c t is the presupposi tio n o f the categories o f r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra ise and blame.
In s o fa r, but only in s o fa r, as we are such r a tio n a l agents the in s t it u t io n s o f r e s p o n s ib ility , p ra ise and blame, reward and punishment can then themselves serve as causes, c o n tr o lle r s , o f behavior. Thus, but o nly th us, can we a c t, fo r example, from fe a r o f flo g g in g or from fe a r o f f a ili n g to liv e up to our id e a ls . I t is on th is ground th a t we have the class o f r e s p o n s ib ility lim it in g preventers which excuse. They w i l l be ju s t those, lik e the jo gg le d elbow, which do not f i t w ith in these categories o f r a tio n a l a c tio n .
At the same time in order fo r the in s tit u tio n s to m ain ta in t h e ir c r e d ib ili t y and thus causal e ffic a c y i t is necessary th a t they be a p p lic a b le and be a p p lie d . I t is on th is ground th a t we have the class o f preventers which do not so l i m it r e s p o n s ib ility and which do not so excuse. They w i l l be ju s t those, lik e the base ch a ra cte r, w hich, w h ile no less e ffic a c io u s as causes, do f i t w ith in the categories o f r a tio n a l a c tio n .
Most o f the s tru c tu re I have ju s t been sketching is o f course h a rd ly novel. I t is sim ply a ve rs io n o f the "c o m p a tib ilis m " or " s o ft determ inism " by now fa m ilia r to most. What my a n a lysis o f "can"s and "co uld"s has supplied thus fa r is sim ply a h e re to fo re m issing founda tio n b lo ck o f th a t s tru c tu re . But th is a n a lysis a c tu a lly provides more. I t helps also to in d ic a te something o f the lim ita tio n s o f th is s o rt o f conceptual ana lysis v is -a -v is d e te rm in is tic w o rrie s .
Too many philosophers have supposed th a t w ith the d is s o lu tio n through conceptual a n a lysis o f the m etaphysical concerns a l l d e te rm in is tic w o rrie s have been e lim in a te d . Once we are aware o f the c r it e r i a r e la tiv e ch aracter o f "canMs and "c o u ld "s , however, we should instead be led to see o the r w o rrie s w hich, u n lik e the m etaphysical, are not d is p e lle d but strengthened by th a t very a n a lysis i t s e l f . Although they are u s u a lly thorough ly confused w ith one another and w ith the m etaphysical in the minds o f a c tu a l d e te rm in is tic w o rrie rs , i t is c le a r th a t there are several p e r fe c tly le g itim a te sources o f concern under th is r u b r ic . One example is whether there may not be broad classes o f behavior w hich, w h ile gen e r a lly assumed to be subsumable under the categories o f r a tio n a l a c tio n , are not a c tu a lly so. Another is the question o f the e ffe c tiv e n e s s o f supposed rewards and punishments. A t h ir d is whether s o c ia l circumstances are not too o fte n such th a t wrong th in g s are done by those who could not have done otherw ise not only as r a tio n a l agents b u t as moral agents.
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Take a d e te rm in is t such as B. F. Skinner.
He c e rta in ly seems to s u ffe r a t times from the m etaphysical confu sio n s. But we need n o t. And once we r e a liz e th a t h is causal notions are n o t, and cannot be incom patible w ith r e s p o n s ib ility , we can see th a t many o f h is suggestions can and should be viewed, not as th re a ts somehow to over throw the conceptual s tru c tu re o f r a tio n a l agency, respon s i b i l i t y , m o ra lity , but ra th e r as urgings to employ th a t s tru c tu re in an in t e llig e n t , inform ed, e ffe c tiv e and humane manner ra th e r than a s tu p id , ig n o ra n t, in e ffe c tiv e and inhumane one.
The American system o f c rim in a l " ju s t ic e " , to c ite but one example o f S kin n e r's ta rg e ts , is indeed a mess. We o ffe r people "rew ards" th a t are e ith e r not r e a lly a v a ila b le or not r e a lly rewarding to them. We o ffe r punishments th a t do cause s u ffe rin g and b r u ta liz a tio n , but do not d e te r. The idea th a t so to do is to tr e a t people as sacred ends in themselves w h ile to proceed otherwise would be to tr e a t them as mere o bjects is as absurd as the idea th a t c a u s a lity is incom patible w ith freedom and d ig n ity .
These genuine d e te rm in is tic w o rrie s , then, u n lik e the m etaphysical, cannot be resolved sim ply by conceptual a n a lysis in c lu d in g even a c o rre c t understanding o f "can"s and " c a n '^'s . But enabling us to see more c le a r ly what these problems are and th a t they are re a l problems is perhaps in i t s e l f a r e s u lt s u f f ic ie n t ly s u b s ta n tia l not to be e n tir e ly d is ta in e d .
